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Section 46: Exposure Draft Legislation and ACCC Draft Misuse of Market Power 
Guidelines 
Professor Stephen Corones 
Queensland University of Technology 
On 5 September 2016, the Federal Treasurer released the Exposure Draft legislation 
containing the Turnbull Government’s changes to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) (CCA) recommended by the Harper Review Committee. The Exposure Draft legislation 
contains a significant reform to s 46(1), namely that it should be amended to prohibit a 
corporation that has a substantial degree of market power from engaging in conduct that has 
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 1  
     Prior to the Federal election on 2 July 2016, the Turnbull Government announced that if 
returned to power it would legislate to give effect to these reforms. In its Media Release the 
Government said that s 46 in its current form was: 
 … not reliably enforceable and permits anti-competitive conduct. This slows the entry and expansion 
of new and innovative firms, delays the entry of new technologies into Australia and impedes 
economic growth in the long run.2   
     It is claimed that these amendments will make it easier for the ACCC or a private party to 
challenge unilateral anti-competitive conduct.3 It also stated that the incorporation of an 
effects test in s 46 was ‘…one of the many actions the Government is taking to protect small 
businesses’.  
     Concurrently with the release of the Exposure Draft legislation, the ACCC released its 
Framework for Misuse of Market Power Guidelines.4 This note will consider the Exposure 
Draft Reforms in relation to s 46 of the CCA; the ACCC’s Framework for misuse of market 
power guidelines; and a recent United Kingdom decision applying the SLC effects test under 
the UK equivalent of s 46 of the CCA. 
Exposure Draft Reforms to s 46 
If the Exposure Draft Reforms are enacted s 46(1) will provide: 
A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not engage in conduct that has 
the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in that or any 
other market. 
                                                            
1 See the Final Report of the Competition Policy Review Committee, March 2015, at 348. Available at: 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/final-report/  
2 The Hon Scott Morrison, “Fixing competition policy to drive economic growth and jobs” Media Release, 16 March 2016 available at 
http://sjm.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/030-2016/?utm_source=wysija&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Media+Release+-
+Fixing+competition+policy+to+drive+economic+growth+and+jobs. 
3 R Sims, “A new section 46 will boost competition – not kill it” Australian Financial Review (22 March 2016), 47. 
4 Available at: https://consultation.accc.gov.au/compliance-enforcement/consultation-on-draft-framework-for-misuse-of-mark 
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     How does this wording differ from the existing prohibition? The first change to note is 
that the ‘taking advantage element’ in the existing s 46(1) prohibition will be deleted. The 
‘taking advantage’ element requires the Court to consider whether the conduct at issue is 
conduct that only a corporation with market power could have undertaken. In other words, 
there must be a connection or causal link between the impugned conduct and the respondent’s 
market power, in the sense that the respondent can only engage in that conduct because it 
possesses substantial market power. The need for this causal link will no longer apply under 
the amended s 46(1). 
     The second change to note is the removal of the mandatory subjective anti-competitive 
purpose element from the existing s 46(1). Under the existing s 46(1) it is necessary to 
consider the subjective purpose of the officers and employees of the corporation responsible 
for the impugned conduct. ‘Purpose’ in this context means: ‘the effect which it is sought to 
achieve – the end in view’.5 While the courts have been prepared to infer such a purpose from 
documentary evidence, proof of this element has been difficult in the past, especially in the 
face of evidence given by witnesses in Court.6 Under the amended s 46(1) a subjective anti-
competitive purpose is only one of three possible tests to be applied. In the absence of 
evidence of purpose, it will be possible to satisfy the prohibition by proving that the effect or 
likely effect of the conduct is a substantial lessening of competition. 
     The third change to note is contained in the proposed s 46(2) which states that: 
…in determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether conduct has the purpose, or has or is likely 
to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, regard must be had to the extent 
to which: 
(a) the conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect of increasing competition 
in the market including by enhancing efficiency … , innovation, product quality or price 
competitiveness in  that market.  
     Importantly, the direction will make clear that any enhancement of economic efficiency is 
only relevant to the extent that it leads to an increase in competition. 
     The fourth change to note is making authorisation available pursuant to s 88 for conduct 
that would otherwise infringe s 46. Authorisation is not currently available for conduct that 
might contravene s 46(1). 
Market structure and the SLC effects test 
The SLC effects test has been applied in the context of the other provisions of Pt IV of the 
CCA.7 In Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (Re 
QCMA). the tribunal adopted the economic concept of ‘workable competition’ as the concept 
of competition which the Act seeks to promote. The Tribunal stated: ‘Competition expresses 
                                                            
5 General Newspapers Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation (1993) 45 FCR 164 at 187 (Davies and Einfeld JJ). 
6 See, e.g. ACCC v Pfizer Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 113 (Flick J). 
7 For a more detailed examination of this question see P Armitage, ‘The evolution of the substantial lessening of competition test – a review 
of the case law’ (2016) 44(2) Australian Business Law Review 74. 
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itself as rivalrous market behaviour’.8 Rivalry is a nebulous concept. It is difficult to measure 
directly. Whether firms engage in rivalry depends largely on the structure of markets. 
‘Market structure’ refers to ‘…those conditions external to the firm which are relatively 
permanent or which change only slowly, and which affect, if they do not determine, the way 
the firm operates’.9 
     The tribunal stated: ‘…there should be independent rivalry in all dimensions of the price-
product-service packages offered to consumers and customers’.10 An effects test requires an 
assessment not just of the effect or likely effect of the conduct on the price of the product 
(whether it will increase), but also the effects on output, quality and service (whether they 
will decrease). This is reflected in s 46(2)(a) of the Exposure Draft legislation set out above. 
     The Re QCMA structural analysis for determining the effect of conduct on competition in 
a market has been applied many times by the Federal Court. 11 Early judicial guidance came 
in 1982 with the decision of the Full Federal Court in Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v 
Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd. 12 In that case the Court held that the state of competitive 
rivalry depended on the structure of the market and that a substantial lessening of competition 
involved a change in the structure of the market. The test for determining the effect of 
conduct on competitive rivalry is to consider: what is the likely structure in the future with the 
conduct at issue compared with what is the likely structure in the future without the conduct. 
The counterfactual analysis begins with market definition and then an analysis of structure, 
with the main focus being on barriers to entry rather than market concentration. 13  
     The next significant step in the evolution of the effects test came in 2003, with the 
decision of French J in Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3).14 Two important points 
emerge from this case. First, French J stressed the need to consider the longer term effect of 
the conduct at issue, rather than short-term phenomena. His Honour concluded that the 
existence of a substantial lessening of competition needs to be assessed over a period of years 
rather than months, and certainly not the half-hourly price spikes which the ACCC argued 
demonstrated the exercise of market power. The Court found that the barriers to entry to the 
wholesale electricity market were not such as to ‘significantly support or contribute to market 
power on the part of any of the market participants’.15 Over the longer term (two years), 
                                                            
8 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169 at 188. For recent commentary on the 
continued relevance of this Tribunal determination see P. Williams, “QCMA, forty years on” The 2016 Bannerman Lecture, 11 February 
2016 available at http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Bannerman%20Competition%20Lecture%202016%20-
%20Dr%20Philip%20Williams%20%20lecture%20paper.pdf. 
9 C Kaysen and D Turner, Antitrust Policy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965) 59. 
10 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169  at 188. 
11 See, for example, Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120 at 123 (Bowen CJ and Fisher 
J); Arnotts Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 336 (Lockhart, Wilcox and Gummow JJ); and Seven Network 
Limited v News Limited (2009) 182 FCR 160 at 282-3 [582] (Dowsett and Lander JJ). 
12 Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120. 
13 Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120 at 123-124 and the Stirling Harbour Services 
Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority (2000) ATPR ¶41-783 at 41,267[12] and (Burchett and Hely JJ). 
14 Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317. 
15 Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at [391]. 
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French J found16 that barriers to entry into electricity generation were relatively low and that 
gas turbines were able to be commissioned in ‘under two years’.17 
     The second important finding in this case relates to the meaning of ‘likely’ in the phrase 
‘likely effect of substantially lessening competition’. French J stated: 
In my opinion, having regard to the statutory context provided by the other sections of Pt IV, 
the correct construction is that “likely” refers to a significant finite probability, or “a real 
chance” rather than “more probable than not”. 18 
Efficiency and the SLC Effects Test 
Section 46(2)(a) of the Exposure Draft legislation requires the court to take account of the 
extent to which the conduct has the purpose, or has the effect or likely effect of increasing 
competition by enhancing efficiency. How is efficiency integrated into the SLC effects test? 
In the long-term competitive structure of markets can be determined by efficiencies. A firm’s 
ability to achieve economies of scale or scope enhances its ability to compete more 
vigorously. These efficiencies will have a bearing on the future state of competition as a 
process of rivalry, and must be taken into account in any assessment of the competitive 
effects of conduct. 19 This was recognised by Emmett J in ACCC v Metcash Trading Ltd, who 
stated: 
 
If the proposed acquisition has the potential to create significant economies of scale or scope for the 
merged firm, it may be desirable to assess whether the potential reduction in competition from the 
reduced number of participants in the relevant market might be offset by the fact that the merged entity 
will be a more efficient and aggressive competitor.20 
     Production efficiencies that result in lower costs arising from economies of scale and 
economies of scope may allow firms with substantial market power to compete more 
vigorously on price. Such efficiencies may allow them to undercut smaller competitors. Such 
conduct has neither the purpose, nor the effect of substantially lessening competition; rather, 
it is a function of the long-run dynamic competitive process. It will not contravene s 46(1) 
under an SLC effects test.  
     Dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation will also be relevant to a firm’s ability to 
compete more effectively. If a firm invests in research and development leading to new 
processes, products or marketing techniques that reduce costs, this will allow the firm to 
compete more effectively. It will not contravene s 46(1) under an effects test even though it 
harms individual competitors. It is a function of the long-run dynamic competitive process. 
This is expressly mentioned as a relevant consideration in s 46(2)(a) of the Exposure Draft 
                                                            
16 Australian Gas Light Co v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 430 [391]. 
17 Australian Gas Light Co v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 457 [493]. 
18 Australian Gas Light Co Ltd v ACCC (No 3) (2003) 137 FCR 317 at [343]. 
19 M Brunt, Economic Essays on Australian and New Zealand Competition Law (Kluwer, Law Int'l, 2003), pp 332-336.  
20 ACCC v Metcash Trading Ltd [2011] FCA 967 at [168] (Emmett J).See P Williams and G Woodbridge, “The Relation of Efficiencies to 
the Substantial Lessening of Competition Test for Mergers: Substitutes or Complements?” (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 435 
at  442. 
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legislation set out above. 
     Any claim of efficiency enhancing competition in s 46 will put some of the burden of 
proof on the respondent.21 The respondent will be obliged to come forward and explain what 
it was seeking to achieve by pursuing the conduct at issue – how the conduct at issue would 
increase competitive rivalry. Seeking to prove or disprove the effect of any claimed 
efficiency on the competitive process may result in a considerable growth in the complexity 
of the evidence which the Court will need to control. 
     Section 46 cases tend to be long and complex and will generally be subject to a case 
management regime. Expert economic evidence is commonplace in cases brought under Pt 
IV of the CCA. The Federal Court Rules 2011 empower the Court to order that there are no 
more than a specified number of expert witnesses; requiring experts who are to give reports 
to meet for the purpose of identifying and addressing the issues in dispute between them; and 
requiring the attendance by parties at a case management conference to consider the most 
economic and efficient means of bringing the proceeding to trial and of conducting the trial.22 
ACCC’s draft Framework for misuse of market power guidelines 
 
In its Framework for misuse of market power guidelines, the ACCC states that their purpose 
‘…will be to provide clarity of the types of conduct and circumstances that may cause the 
ACCC concern under the proposed s 46, and importantly, the types of conduct and 
circumstances that will not cause the ACCC concern’. 
 
     At [4.2] the ACCC states that the proposed s 46 will not change its approach to market 
definition as set out in its Merger Guidelines.23 At [4.4] of the Framework for misuse of 
market power guidelines, the ACCC explains how it will apply the SLC effects test in 
relation to s 46. The ACCC states that ‘…subject to the two new statutory factors, the 
proposed law will not change the ACCC’s established approach to analysis of whether 
conduct substantially lessens competition’. One assumes that this will involve a 
counterfactual assessment.  
 
     The need to prove that the impugned conduct will have an adverse effect on the structure 
of the market requires the ACCC to identify the most likely counterfactual and that there is a 
‘real chance’ that it might occur (the intermediate issue). This will be easier in relation to past 
conduct, where the most likely counterfactual could well be the situation that prevailed before 
the impugned conduct took effect. However, it will be more problematic if the impugned 
conduct is being challenged prospectively. The ACCC’s Framework for misuse of market 
power guidelines do not indicate the circumstances in which it will apply the counterfactual. 
 
                                                            
21 Final Report of the Competition Policy Review Committee, March 2015, at 344. 
22 Rule 5.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. 
23 ACCC, Merger Guidelines (21 November 2008) available at: http://www.accc.gov.au/publications/merger‐
guidelines. 
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     The SLC effects test under the proposed s 46 is similar to the way abusive exclusionary 
conduct is examined under the misuse of market power provisions of the EU and the UK. The 
relevant equivalent provisions are Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)  and s 18(1) prohibition under the Competition Act 1998 (UK). 
 
     In 2009, the European Commission issued Guidance on its enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 of the TFEU) to abusive exclusionary 
conduct by dominant undertakings.24 At para [20] the Commission sets out a list of structural 
factors that it will take into account in assessing whether conduct is likely to lead to anti-
competitive foreclosure. Paragraphs 21 and 22 then explain the circumstances in which it will 
apply the counterfactual and the circumstances in which it will not: 
 
21. When pursuing a case the Commission will develop the analysis of the general factors mentioned in 
paragraph 20, together with the more specific factors described in the sections dealing with certain 
types of exclusionary conduct, and any other factors which it may consider to be appropriate. This 
assessment will usually be made by comparing the actual or likely future situation in the relevant 
market (with the dominant undertaking's conduct in place) with an appropriate counterfactual, such as 
the simple absence of the conduct in question or with another realistic alternative scenario, having 
regard to established business practices. 
 
22. There may be circumstances where it is not necessary for the Commission to carry out a detailed 
assessment before concluding that the conduct in question is likely to result in consumer harm. If it 
appears that the conduct can only raise obstacles to competition and that it creates no efficiencies, its 
anti-competitive effect may be inferred. This could be the case, for instance, if the dominant 
undertaking prevents its customers from testing the products of competitors or provides financial 
incentives to its customers on condition that they do not test such products, or pays a distributor or a 
customer to delay the introduction of a competitor's product. 
     In analysing the effect of a provision or conduct on competition it is necessary to have a 
counterfactual market structure in mind. It would be helpful if the ACCC were to provide 
guidance on this aspect of the SLC effects test , or to indicate whetherr it intends to depart 
from counterfactual analysis in its application of the SLC effects test to s 46. 
       At [4.6] the ACCC’s Framework for misuse of market power guidelines provide the 
following examples of conduct that it considers may raise concerns under the amended s 
46(1): 
 refusal to supply an essential input, without any legitimate commercial reason for the 
refusal; 
 land banking; 
 predatory pricing; and 
 bundling a competitive product with a monopoly product. 
 
     At [4.7] the ACCC provides the following examples of conduct that it considers would not 
breach the amended s 46(1): 
 research and development; 
 standardised or national ricing by large retail chains; 
                                                            
24 Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings 
OJ 2009 C 45/7. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN. 
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 price war; and 
 investing in new production technology to increase efficiency. 
 
Streetmap.EU Ltd v Google Inc 
A counterfactual assessment was applied by the England and Wales High Court (Chancery 
Division) in Streetmap EU Ltd v Google Inc,25 claim of a contravention of Art 102 of the 
TFEU and s 18(1) prohibition under the Competition Act 1998 (UK).The essential facts of 
this case were that Streetmap carried on business in the market for online mapping services. 
Google carried on business in the market for online general search engines. In 2005 Google 
launched an online mapping product called ‘Google Maps’. 
     The visual display of Google’s search results is referred to as the ‘Search Engine Results 
Page’ or ‘SERP’. The SERP includes links to relevant websites or webpages. The user can 
click on the link to get direct access to the site or page. Under the old Maps OneBox Google 
listed other British online mapping providers including Streetmap. Under the new Maps 
OneBox Google displayed a clickable thumbnail map from Google Maps, and no other online 
maps. The essence of Streemap’s claim of a contravention of Article 102 of the TFEU and s 
18(1) prohibition under the Competition Act 1998 (UK) was that this was a form of 
discrimination. It was alleged that Google was using its dominant position in the general 
search engine market to foreclose competitors of Google Maps in the market for on-line 
maps. Streetmap’s claim was not that Google should not have displayed a clickable thumb 
map on its SERP, since this was clearly a benefit to consumers. Rather, it argued that Google 
should have provided a link to Streetmap and other mapping providers as well as Google 
Maps in the search results to enable them to get access to customers.26 
     Roth J stated: 
I have concluded that introduction of the new-style Maps OneBox was intended to improve Google's 
offering in the market for general search …The unusual and challenging feature of this case is that 
conduct which was pro-competitive in the market in which the undertaking is dominant is alleged to be 
abusive on the grounds of an alleged anti-competitive effect in a distinct market in which it is not 
dominant.27  
 
     Streetmap alleged that Google’s purpose in introducing the new Maps OneBox was to 
foreclose competition from Google Maps’ competitors in the online mapping market. Roth J 
concluded that Google’s main purpose in introducing the new Maps OneBox was to improve 
its general search engine by remedying its perceived deficiencies when compared with its 
competitors in the general search market.28 
     In considering the effect or likely effect of the new Maps OneBox on competition Roth J 
                                                            
25 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch) (Roth J). 
26 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [55] and [62]-[63]. 
27 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [84]. 
28 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [80]. 
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applied the counterfactual approach:  
 
In addressing the effect of particular conduct, it is necessary to have in mind the alternative position 
against which that effect falls to be assessed: i.e. what is usually referred to as the counterfactual. Both 
sides' economic experts approached this on the basis that the relevant counterfactual is the situation 
which prevailed before the new-style Maps OneBox was introduced. That was the old-style Maps 
OneBox, which did not contain any thumbnail map… There was no suggestion by Streetmap that this 
old-style Maps OneBox gave rise to an abuse.29  
     Roth J concluded on a consideration of all the evidence that the introduction the new Maps 
OneBox did not have an appreciable effect in taking custom away from Streetmap, and that it 
was unlikely to give rise to anti-competitive foreclosure.30 The market for online maps in the 
UK was growing significantly and steadily over the period 2000-2010. His Honour observed: 
The main providers competing with Google Maps in 2007 were Streetmap and MultiMap. But the fact 
that Google Maps gained market share compared to Streetmap and MultiMap does not in itself 
indicate, let alone establish, that the new-style Maps OneBox was the cause, or even a contributory 
cause. Any relative success of Google Maps is equally explicable on the basis of features of Google 
Maps that attracted users: i.e., competition on the merits.31 
     Google Maps had adopted many new product developments such as ‘natural language’ 
searching which allowed a user to type in a request for a destination such as the British 
Museum, without a street address. There was significant evidence that ‘Streetmap was 
deficient or lagging behind as regards many of these functional developments’.32  
     Roth J noted: 
It is axiomatic, as I remarked earlier, that competition by a dominant company is to be encouraged. 
Where – as here – its conduct is pro-competitive on the market where it is dominant, it would to my 
mind be perverse to find that it contravenes competition law because it may have a non-appreciable 
effect on a related market where competition is not otherwise weakened. 33  
     This case demonstrates that harm to individual competitors is not to be equated with harm 
to competition as a process, and that a firm with substantial market power should not be 
precluded by competition law from competing vigorously on the merits through product 
innovation. 
Authorisation for s 46 conduct 
Schedule 10 item 1 of the Exposure Draft legislation will amend and simplify s 88 of the 
CCA and provide a single test for authorisation under which authorisation may be granted  in 
relation to conduct to which Pt IV would or might apply including  conduct that would 
otherwise be prohibited under s 46. 
     Schedule 10 item 2 of the Exposure Draft legislation will amend s 90(6) of the CCA. The 
                                                            
29 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [100]. 
30 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [139]. 
31 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [116]. 
32 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [118]. 
33 Streetmap EU Limited v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 at [98]. 
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new test for authorisation will provide: 
 
The Commission must not make a determination granting an authorisation under section 88 in relation 
to conduct unless the Commission is satisfied in all the circumstances:  
 
(a) that the conduct would not have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition; or 
(b) that: 
(i) the conduct would result, or be likely to result, in a benefit to the public; and  
(ii) the benefit would outweigh the detriment to the public that would result, or be 
likely to result, from the conduct.  
     Thus, if the ACCC determines that either the conduct would not have, or be likely to have, 
an SLC effect; or, the conduct would result or be likely to result in a benefit to the public that 
would outweigh the detriment to the public that would result or be likely to result from the 
conduct, it may grant an authorisation. 
     Given that the applicant for authorisation of s 46 conduct already has substantial market 
power, the ACCC is likely to scrutinise the conduct at issue carefully before being convinced 
that it gives rise to a net public benefit. 
     Cross subsidisation is an example of s 46 conduct that may be eligible for authorisation 
after the changes take effect. Cross subsidisation may be a form of predatory pricing. Where 
a firm allocates disproportionately high costs to one product or geographic market where it 
faces little or no competition in order to charge very low prices for another product or 
geographic market where it faces strong competition, this may harm competition in the latter 
market. However, where cross subsidisation is practised by a corporation with substantial 
market power to enable it to subsidise services to remote communities, or to comply with a 
universal service obligation, reasoning of that kind might be relevant as a public benefit in an 
application for authorisation.34 
Conclusion 
As regards the ultimate issue, the amended s 46(1) may make it easier to prove a substantial 
lessening of competition where the conduct has its effect in the market where the respondent 
has substantial market power. If the respondent incumbent is a monopolist seeking to deter 
new entry the threshold could be quite low as demonstrated by the Rural Press case.35 This is 
because the very presence of a powerful single firm in that market will mean that competitive 
constraints are weak. Any new injection of competition is likely to enhance competitive 
rivalry, and any attempt to stop it is likely to be a substantial lessening of competition.  
 
     However, where the impugned conduct has its anti-competitive effect in a market other 
than the one in which the respondent has substantial market power, it may be more difficult 
to prove a substantial lessening of competition. In addition, the need to off-set any lessening 
of competition with the pro-competitive effects of enhanced efficiencies adds a layer of 
                                                            
34NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 at 140 [137]. 
35 Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 53 at 71 [41]. 
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complexity to the s 46 SLC effects test.  
 
     The proposed s 46 may not provide the additional protection for small businesses that the 
Government claims. A common fallacy is to equate harm to individual competitors with harm 
to competition. The object of the new s 46(1) is to protect competition as a process of rivalry, 
not to protect a class of competitors such as small businesses. Protecting competition will 
generate efficiency for the benefit of consumers; it will not generate fairness for small 
business competitors. Where corporations, such as the large supermarket chains, are 
undercutting small retailers by relying on lower costs associated with economies of scale and 
scope, such conduct has neither the purpose, nor the effect of substantially lessening 
competition. Rather, it is a function of the long-run dynamic competitive process. 
Supermarkets will only be at risk under the new s 46(1) if they engage in conduct that erects 
artificial barriers leading to long-run actual or potential foreclosure.  
 
     As Roth J indicated in the Streetmap case, it is axiomatic that firms with substantial 
market power should be able to compete on the merits. If they innovate and introduce new 
functional developments, their smaller competitors may be harmed but an effects test under s 
46 will not be of assistance to them in forcing their larger rival to lend them a helping hand. 
This is reflected in the direction to the Court in the proposed s 46(2) to take efficiency into 
account in so far as it increases competitive rivalry, and is accepted by the ACCC in its draft 
Framework for misuse of market power guidelines. 
 
